Lord Ezra: My Lords, I thank the Minister for that encouraging Answer. Does he recall that it was indicated in the energy review that the share of coal in electricity would decline from the current level of about 30 per cent to half that during the next 15 years? In view of the need to achieve diversity of energy supply and to reduce increased dependence on imported gas, I am sure that the Minister agrees that that trend should be reversed. Furthermore, does he agree that the most effective way of doing that is to press ahead with the development of clean coal technology much more effectively than at present and to establish demonstration plants without further delay? The technology has now been proven, including the extraction of CO2 and its storage.

Baroness Crawley: My Lords, I assume that the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, is referring to the NATO operation and the coalition operation—Operation Enduring Freedom. The position of NATO is that we can see benefits of working closely. NATO's revised operational plan seeks to ensure far greater synergy between the NATO and coalition operations. The NATO operation is under various UN resolutions. Operation Enduring Freedom is under the invitation of the Afghan Government. The plan incorporates clear command arrangements for co-ordination and, where necessary, for sorting out any conflicts of operations under the respective missions, but there will not be a complete merger as yet.

Palestinian Elections

Lord Dykes: My Lords, I thank the Minister for that Answer. Bearing it in mind that President Mahmoud Abbas also still has his own constitutional and legislative powers and allowing for the amazing selectivity of President George Bush and his own definitions of democracy and what is right and wrong in international law, will the Government make sure that they have further discussions with the US Government to persuade them to persuade Israel to start making moves on withdrawing military forces and on reducing the checkpoints in the Occupied Territories from now on, before the Israeli elections, to facilitate the workings of the new Palestinian Parliament, in particular also the transport of Members of that Parliament from Gaza?

Lord Triesman: My Lords, the discussions with the United States will go on through the quartet and, I have no doubt, at a bilateral level. The discussions held at quartet level are consistent in saying that all parties—I repeat, all parties—must respect the processes that are set out in the road map for the Middle East. All parties have their obligations and have to try to make sure that democratic institutions thrive in what has been a very difficult environment. The balanced view that is taken in that road map is precisely the view that everyone—Israel and the Palestinian Authority—have to respect.

Lord Howell of Guildford: My Lords, it is some time before the new Hamas Government takes over. Would it not be wise on this issue and on the question of financing to wait a few weeks to see how the Hamas Government will adjust their views? In looking at the flow of funds to the Palestinian Authority, would it not also be wise to refer to the considerable wealth of the Arab Gulf states around, which is at the moment diverted in rather small amounts to Palestine, and encourage them to ante up and pay from the huge revenues that they have gained from the higher oil price? Is that not the way that greater support for the Palestinian Authority might best be developed?

Lord Phillips of Sudbury: My Lords, I revisited Israel, east Jerusalem and the West Bank, just before the Palestinian elections, and was taken round by five marvellous Jewish and Israeli NGOs. The message I got from them was loud and clear, quite apart from the evidence of one's own eyes. Unless the issues of the headlong settlement of the West Bank, the cantonisation of the West Bank, the 600 checkpoints in the West Bank and the humiliation of the Palestinians in the West Bank are addressed urgently, there is no hope whatever of keeping power, within the Hamas confederacy, in the hands of the moderates. Would the Government please urge the Americans to do something effective and visual about the roadmap to that end?

Scottish Parliaments (Candidates) Bill [HL]

Read a third time.
	Clause 2 [Dissemination of terrorist publications]:

Lord Goodhart: My Lords, I rise to say that we are genuinely grateful to the Government for their decision, taken some weeks ago, to accept the principle that offences under Clause 2 as well as under Clause 1 should require intent, or at least recklessness. We on these Benches would have preferred recklessness not to be there, but we voted on that on the first day of Report, and lost.
	The version of Clause 2 tabled by the Government on Report was, we thought, unsatisfactory, confusing and extremely difficult for anyone to understand. We therefore put forward our amendment which was not different in principle, but which we thought provided a simpler and clearer definition of the real issue. Subsequently, the Government have produced a very much revised version of their original amendment which has been considered by bodies representing the university librarians and has met with their approval. In those circumstances, we see no useful purpose to be served in seeking to insist on our own amendment. We on these Benches, and no doubt noble Lords on other Benches in your Lordships' House, are content to accept the present version put forward by the Government which, we are glad to say, will bring to an end one contentious issue on the Bill.

Baroness Williams of Crosby: My Lords, I, too, thank those who have produced this comprehensive amendment. It is very pleasing that agreement has been reached. The Government, the opposition and my noble friend have contributed substantially to that, as have the chief executive of Universities UK and the chairman of the British Library.
	At this late stage in the game I am reluctant to pick any nits, if one can use that phrase in this noble House, but, like the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, I have one other question concerning deposit libraries to which I seek a response from the Minister. This time it involves not the noble Baroness, Lady Scotland, but the noble Lord, Lord Bassam of Brighton, who I am pleased to see is responding to the questions being raised. In the debate that occurred on Amendment No. 84 on the final day of Report, the noble Lord said:
	"This amendment, prompted by those changes, will give further protection to the interests of libraries, for example. That is because publications could conceivably be seized from libraries because of the actions of particular librarians".—[Official Report, 25/1/06; col. 1254.]
	He added that it was a "matter of interpretation". I should be most grateful if the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, in responding to the questions he has been asked, would comment on what interpretation he was placing on that because he will appreciate that a lot of librarians became worried by the awful prospect of gentlemen and ladies, possibly wearing black balaclavas, coming in and forfeiting large chunks of deposit libraries. Perhaps he could say something to calm those fears.

Lord Bassam of Brighton: moved Amendment No. 2:
	Page 3, line 30, at end insert—
	"(4A) In subsection (1) references to the effect of a person's conduct in relation to a terrorist publication include references to an effect of the publication on one or more persons to whom it is or may become available as a consequence of that conduct."
	Page 4, line 6, leave out from "intention" to end of line 7 and insert "specified in subsection (1)(a)"
	On Question, amendments agreed to.
	Clause 3 [Application of ss. 1 and 2 to internet activity etc.]:

Lord Goodhart: My Lords, in moving Amendment No. 4, I shall speak also to Amendments Nos. 5, 6, 7, 8 and 10. This group of amendments applies to Clause 3, which deals with the dissemination of material by Internet service providers. The Internet is now, as all noble Lords will know, an extremely important method of transmitting information and opinions. The transmission by an Internet service provider could include the transmission of a terrorist publication. Internet service providers do not and in practice cannot monitor all the material that they transmit. Clause 3 contains a mechanism for giving notice to an Internet service provider if the authorities discover that the provider is transmitting what is called in the Bill "unlawfully terrorism-related" material. Notice is given by a constable if, in his opinion, the Internet service provider is transmitting such material. "Unlawfully terrorism-related" material is defined in subsection (7); I will return to that definition later.
	The notice to be served under Clause 3 requires the removal of the offending material within two working days. Non-compliance with the notice is not, in itself, an offence, but a non-compliant Internet service provider is treated as endorsing the material and, therefore, exposed to prosecution under Clause 1 or 2. An Internet service provider could, in theory, object to the notice and defend the prosecution on the grounds that the material was not, in fact, unlawful. However, the inevitable result in practice is that the Internet service provider will comply with the notice. That provider has no benefit from fighting the notice. If it does so—or continues to transmit that material and then seeks to defend a prosecution—it faces costs, considerable time and expense from the court, and a possibility of conviction. Against that, it will get no benefit at all in practice from objecting to the notice. The obvious answer for any Internet service provider is simply to accept the notice and remove what is regarded as offensive material.
	On Report, the noble Baroness, Lady Scotland, said that market forces would deal with that problem. Well, they will not; in fact, market forces make it obvious that Internet service providers will not contest any notice that is given to them. It is also extremely unlikely that whoever has authored the material that is being objected to will challenge the notice. They may well not know that it has even been blocked.
	We believe that this gives rise to two big problems concerned with freedom of speech. It is convenient to speak to them together because, while they are quite different in nature, only by doing so does one get the full picture. The first relates to the Internet, which, as I have already said, is an extremely important method of communication. However, many authoritarian governments block unwanted material and take steps to ensure that such blocking is effective. That is notorious in, for example, Saudi Arabia, but particularly in China.
	There has been much recent publicity in China about Google, which is setting up a new search engine for customers there. The Chinese authorities are insisting that it should not carry material which it does not want Google to carry for people there. For example, if in China you search for references to Falun Gong, you would only get extremely critical articles saying that that is a dreadful terrorist organisation. You would not get the other side of the story at all. Therefore, to allow the police to serve Clause 3 notices—in effect, to block transmissions—with no oversight and by any other authority, especially with no judicial control, is not acceptable. It may be acceptable to the Chinese or Russian authorities, but not here.
	We believe that this is a real threat to freedom of speech, and Amendments Nos. 4, 5 and 10 would require judicial authority for the issue of the notice. The procedure that we envisage is something similar to that for the issue of an arrest warrant. No notice will be given to the Internet service provider, and the service of the notice will be delayed by a few hours—24 hours, at most. The judge would, of course, have to satisfy himself or herself that there were indeed grounds for serving the notice. This will have a limited effect for obvious reasons, particularly for time, and we accept that there could be no hearing; but at least this step would prevent obvious abuses and would make the police think twice about whether the notice was really needed before they went to a judge to obtain authority to serve it.
	The second problem, dealt with by Amendments Nos. 6, 7 and 8, is the extreme width of the definition of what is "unlawfully terrorism-related" in subsection (7). I shall read it to noble Lords to demonstrate its breadth. The subsection states:
	"For the purposes of this section a statement or an article or record is unlawfully terrorism-related if it constitutes . . . something that is capable of being understood as a direct or indirect encouragement or other inducement to the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism or Convention offences".
	I draw the attention of noble Lords to the words, "capable of being understood". All sorts of things are capable of being understood in all sorts of different ways by different people. Material may be capable of being understood in ways that are unexpected by anyone who creates or transmits certain material. Saying that that material is "unlawfully terrorism-related", simply because it may possibly be understood by some unknown person as encouraging terrorism, is way beyond anything that is reasonable.
	Before anything that is being transmitted by an ISP is blocked, the police and the judge should be satisfied that that material is "likely to be" understood as encouraging or assisting terrorism. A Clause 1 offence is committed only if the published statement is "likely to be understood" as encouraging terrorism. That is on the face of the Bill. Similarly, in Clause 2(3) a publication is a terrorist publication only if it "likely to be understood" by persons to whom it is available as encouraging terrorism.
	There is no justification whatever for applying a weaker test in Clause 3 for something that is unlawfully terrorism-related. Otherwise, we will end up in the absurd situation where the police can serve a notice under Clause 3 warning an Internet service provider to remove material from transmission, even though that material is not "likely to be understood" as encouraging terrorism, but merely that it is possible that it might be. It might be material that could legitimately be published or disseminated by its creator under Clauses 1 or 2. That is plainly wrong. The test for the notice under Clause 3 should be the same as the tests under Clauses 1 and 2.
	The combination of those factors—the absence of any oversight of the police's use of their powers under Clause 3 and the unreasonably wide meaning given to "unlawfully terrorism-related"—mean that Clause 3 as it stands is likely—I repeat, likely—to be a serious threat to freedom of communication. I have little doubt that those views will be shared by the courts.
	These are important amendments that should be accepted by the Government. I beg to move.

Lord Bassam of Brighton: My Lords, to use a word much favoured by the noble Lord, Lord Kingsland, I shall be telegraphic in putting the Government's argument. I see no point in prolonging a debate which we have had on two, if not three, occasions.
	As ever, we are grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Goodhart, for tabling these amendments because they enable us to get to the point of the issue. We do not have a lot more to add to comments made from these Benches on Report. I will, however, deal with Amendments Nos. 4, 5 and 10, and then Amendments Nos. 6 to 8.
	As the noble Lord, Lord Goodhart, has expertly explained, Amendments Nos. 4, 5 and 10 insert a measure of judicial oversight into the notice provisions on the Internet in Clause 3. I understand that this has been principally argued for by the Opposition because they believe that the effect of a notice, when served on an Internet service provider, will be to force it to comply. The Government believe that this is incorrect, and that judicial oversight is unnecessary. First, we do not think that the effect of the notices will be to oblige Internet service providers to comply in all cases. This is the case not just because of the effect of such compliance on their customers and brand reputation, but also because the principal mischief this clause is aimed at is that of those who run websites—the webmasters—not Internet service providers. We expect very few notices to be served on Internet service providers.
	Secondly—as the noble Lord, Lord Goodhart, conceded on Report—the amendment is not even desired by the UK Internet industry. UK Internet service providers want a process similar to those already in operation for communications data. They want a single point of contact between them and the prosecuting authorities, and clear guidance on what, how and when to deal with notices when received. That is exactly what we aim to deliver.
	Thirdly, the inclusion of "intent and recklessness" in Clauses 1 and 2, while not directly dealing with notices, makes it far more likely that an Internet service provider—or, indeed, a webmaster—will take issue with the serving of a notice, and refuse. More importantly, we are also worried that the insertion of "judicial involvement," proposed by this amendment, will prove unnecessarily burdensome, especially as the Amendment requires a senior judicial level of involvement; that is, the involvement of a High Court judge.

Lord Bassam of Brighton: My Lords, I do not think that they are particularly difficult to reconcile. Clearly, when a notice is served, it will be burdensome to deal with that particular procedure, at that particular time, and in that particular case.
	The other argument I take some exception to is that made by the noble Lord, Lord Goodhart, in comparing what we are doing here with what has been happening in China with Google. I think the analogy with China is quite inappropriate. After all, a notice under this clause does not require anyone to remove or censor material. It simply advises an Internet service provider that it will not be able to rely on the defence of non-endorsement. In that sense I cannot see that it is a direct restriction to freedom of speech in the terms used by the noble Lord to describe, and compare with, what is happening in China with Google. In any event—and I have heard the noble Lord say this—freedom of speech is not exactly an absolute concept with regard to the Internet. For instance, I am sure the noble Lord would accept the point that it is inappropriate and wrong for child pornographers to have access to Internet to publish their appalling material, and that we should seek to limit such access. So, I cannot accept his argument on that.
	Turning to Amendments Nos. 6, 7 and 8, again I do not believe that there is much to add. The test of whether some or all of the persons who come into contact with a statement are likely to understand that statement as encouragement exists in Clauses 1 and 2. Under Clause 3, a constable applies the test of whether a statement is capable of being understood as unlawfully terrorism-related when considering issuing a notice. That difference is the root of the difference in the tests. The constable is asked to make a judgment as to whether a statement is capable of being understood as unlawfully terrorism-related. The noble Lord's amendment would require a constable to second-guess whether the court will take the view that an audience is likely to understand the statement as an encouragement. The Government's view is that this is unnecessary, and that the police ought to issue a notice saying that they are concerned about the statement's presence as they would under present drafting.
	I realise that there is a difference of view on this; I suspect that the noble Lord will not find favour with the Government's response, but we have to reach a conclusion. I hope that the noble Lord will reflect further upon it; I am asking the noble Lord, Lord Goodhart, to withdraw his amendments, but not with great expectation.

On Question, Whether the said amendment (No. 4) shall be agreed to?
	Their Lordships divided: Contents, 148; Not-Contents, 147

Lord Boston of Faversham: My Lords, the Question is that this amendment be agreed to. As may as are of that opinion will say, "Content". To the contrary, "Not-Content".

Lord Bassam of Brighton: My Lords, this amendment makes provision to ensure that service providers who fall within the definition of "mere conduits" are able to avail themselves of the protections in the Electronic Commerce (EC Directive) Regulations 2002 against criminal liability. "Mere conduits" are, broadly speaking, providers who supply transmission and access services. These are usually Internet service providers who may also perform a number of other functions.
	During discussions between officials, the UK Internet Service Providers Association and LINX, the ambiguity of the relationship between the regulations and the Bill was of clear concern to the industry. The Government have been less concerned, although obviously not complacent, because of the way the offences in Clauses 1 and 2 are structured. The intent and subjective recklessness tests and the defences of non-endorsement in both clauses mean that mere conduits who would be very unlikely to know about the presence of statements equally would be very unlikely to be considered criminally liable under the terms of the Bill. However, to provide additional clarity, during the Report stage, I confirmed to the House that the Government intend to bring forward a statutory instrument which will apply the protection against criminal liability currently enjoyed by mere conduits to the Terrorism Bill, as well as other provisions of the regulations. It is the Government's aim to do so as soon as is practicably possible with the aim that it will be completed within this parliamentary Session. So I can say that all sides of your Lordships' House are committed to achieving the same effect. In essence we are seeking to examine the best means to provide the necessary protections via the statutory instrument which we intend to bring forward.
	I cannot advise the House to accept the amendment as it confers far wider protection than is granted under the terms of the e-commerce regulations. I am sure that the noble Lord will accept that point. It does so by conferring protection on transmissions rather than just the mere conduits protected by the regulations. We believe that the approach I have outlined to solving this little problem is the best way forward, given all the other safeguards that exist, not least the requirement for intent or subjective recklessness. I do not believe that the short gap that may occur between Royal Assent and the making of the statutory instrument will place anyone at undue risk and certainly the industry does not seem concerned about the issue either.
	The noble Lord, Lord Goodhart, sought another assurance about the seizure of articles under Clause 28. I can give the assurance on the ISPA request regarding search and seizure that the powers to search, seize and forfeit cover only articles that can be disseminated under Clause 2. Servers and other IT equipment owned by ISPs do not come under that definition. The noble Lord asked whether the Government accept that exemptions are not overridden—yes we do and, as I explained, we will deal with the matter through secondary legislation.
	I hope that having heard what I said about the amendment and about our intention to bring forward a statutory instrument as soon as we can, the noble Lord will feel happy to withdraw his amendment.

Lord Goodhart: My Lords, the amendment relates to the standard of proof on matters that have to be proved by the defendant. A defendant is never required to prove anything beyond reasonable doubt, but there are two possible standards that a defendant may be required to meet. The higher of the two is that the defendant must prove his or her case on the balance of probabilities. The lower level is that there is what is known as an evidential burden of proof; that is, if the defendant produces enough evidence to raise an arguable case, the burden shifts back from him or her to the prosecution to disprove that defence beyond reasonable doubt. The lower standard—simply having to show an arguable case—has been applied in a number of terrorist defences; for example, the evidential burden of proof applies to seven different sections of the Terrorism Act 2000 by virtue of Section 118 of that Act.
	Requiring a defendant to prove particular facts as part of his or her defence, of course, conflicts with the general presumption of innocence and must, therefore, be used only with great care and when really necessary. I accept that in some circumstances where the facts are in the particular knowledge of the defendant, requiring the defendant to give evidence of those facts may be justified. But a reverse burden of proof should not be used beyond that.
	This amendment applies to three provisions. The first two apply respectively to Clauses 1(6)(b) and 2(7)(b), which are similar. They both provide that it is a defence for the defendant on a charge of publishing or disseminating terrorist statements to show that what was published or disseminated did not represent the defendant's own views and, furthermore, clearly did not represent those views. It can be argued that the first issue—that the statement did not represent the views of the defendant—is wholly within the knowledge of the defendant and, therefore, requiring him or her to prove that on the balance of probabilities is acceptable. But the second issue—was it made clear in the context that they did not represent the defendant's views—is different.
	Let us look, for example, at a magazine which publishes an article which is sympathetic to the terrorist acts of Hamas. The magazine contains an article also which puts the contrary view. The magazine is prosecuted and the prosecution says that it has been acting recklessly. The publishers of the magazine satisfy the court that they do not agree with the article which is sympathetic to Hamas and that that article does not therefore represent their view. But the question arises: have they made that clear? That seems to be to a large extent an objective test. It depends not on the views of the defendants but on the likely reaction of readers, which is not something that is in within the specific knowledge of the defendants. I believe that it should be beyond doubt that once the defendants have shown what steps they took to make clear their disagreement with the views expressed in the article, it is for the prosecution to show that those steps were insufficient.
	The third clause to which this amendment applies is Clause 3(5). This arises out of the problem of repeat statements; that is, where a blocked statement reappears in the same form through the same Internet service provider, which is very difficult to prevent. It is a defence under the Bill to show that the Internet service provider has taken every step it reasonably could to prevent a repeat statement being transmitted. It is reasonable to require an Internet service provider to give evidence about what steps it took. But the question of whether it should have taken further steps is technical, because it is a matter of having to tell the court what other steps might have been available to be taken, and objective, because it is a test of reasonableness. The burden of showing that the ISP could reasonably have taken further steps must once again be on the prosecution.
	I accept, reluctantly, that it is legitimate to require the defendants to explain their views, or what steps they have taken to publicise those views or to prevent repeat statements being published. But it is wrong to require a defendant to prove matters which may not be within his own knowledge and may be objective in their application. The amendment aims to prevent what I believe would be an injustice and is inconsistent with the rules of our criminal process and the need to prove the guilt of the defendant. Any reverse burden of proof should be limited only to those elements of the offence which are primarily within the knowledge of the defendant and should not go beyond that, as the Bill now does. I beg to move.

Lord Goldsmith: My Lords, I rise with a little trepidation as I have not taken part in this debate before. The House may know that I am deputising here for my noble friend Lady Scotland.
	As the noble Lord, Lord Goodhart, has made clear, this amendment relates to the defences in Clauses 1 and 2 of the Bill, including as they are applied by Clause 3. The House has debated Clauses 1 to 3 at length, and plainly I do not want to go back over that ground. It is right, however, to remind the House that this is an area where the extensive amendments which have been brought forward into Clauses 1 and 2 have done two things. First, they make it clear that the Government have been prepared to listen to the concerns expressed in Committee and to refine Clauses 1 and 2 to take account of those. I refer particularly to the acceptance that the test of recklessness should be subjective rather than objective. Secondly, flowing from that, the result is the heavy burden on the prosecution in each of these offences. It was always a heavy burden, but it is heavier still. In particular, when one looks at the offences of recklessness, the prosecution will now have to prove beyond reasonable doubt the criminal standard; not simply that it would be reasonable to be concerned about the risk, but that there were those aspects of the defendant's own state of mind sufficient to justify subjective recklessness. It is important because one does not get into the defences under Clauses 1 and 2 until and unless the prosecution has proved that.
	I know that at an earlier stage the noble Lord, Lord Goodhart, indicated that the switch of evidential or legal burden was a poor substitute for changing the intent that was necessary, and that the House has not gone quite as far as he wanted on that occasion. It is right to say that although this is not limited only to intent, it is subjective recklessness which is the only addition to it.
	I also recognise that in these amendments the noble Lord accepts, in relation to Clauses 1 and but not Clause 3, that the elements in the defence should be treated differently. He accepts that, he said, reluctantly. I am not sure why he said that, but never mind; he accepts that a defendant should have to show whether he himself endorsed these views. He accepts that in relation to Clauses 1 and 2, and therefore the defendant will continue to bear the legal burden in respect of that element. His concern in relation to Clauses 1 and 2 is showing whether it was clear in all the circumstances that the statement or publication did not express the defendant's view or have his endorsement. Under the amendment, the defendant would bear the evidential burden only in respect of this element; one needs to be quite clear what that means in practice. Having the evidential burden means no more than raising the issue, whereupon it is for the prosecution to prove—it may well do so before the defendant ever reaches the witness stand—that the defence is not made out.
	In previous debates, the question of whether a burden should fall on the defendant has been discussed. It is not a straightforward matter. The House is also well aware that ultimately it may be for a court to determine whether it is appropriate to have placed a legal burden on the defendant in the particular circumstances. What is being provided by the Government in these clauses does not prevent the court from taking that view. The Government's view would be that it is perfectly right, appropriate, proper and compatible to place the burden in these circumstances on the defendant; but it would be ultimately for a court to say so. The noble Lord's final remark was that this is contrary to principles and present law. If that were so to the extent that it made the trial unfair, that is a matter the court could deal with.
	I then look to why, in the Government's view, it is fair and reasonable to place the legal burden on the defendants in these cases. I start with Clause 3(5). I was a little unclear about what the noble Lord said. I may have misheard him but I understood him to accept that it was reasonable that the defendant should have to prove what steps he had taken. But the amendment would take that burden away from the defendant because it applies to the whole of the defence in Clause 3(5), not just a part of it.

Lord Bassam of Brighton: My Lords, I suspect that the noble Baroness's understanding of what she described as informal camps is accurate. She clearly is knowledgeable on the subject and knows much more about it than I. No doubt such a defence could be offered in those circumstances, but that does not deter me from the view that we have expressed before on this amendment and how it has been argued by the noble Lord, Lord Goodhart. We clearly have a difference of view, and no doubt the noble Lord will seek to ensure that that difference of view is expressed by your Lordship's House.

On Question, Whether the said amendment (No. 12) shall be agreed to?
	Their Lordships divided: Contents, 79; Not-Contents, 145

Lord Thomas of Gresford: My Lords, your Lordships will recall that more than 20 years ago, the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 abolished the infamous sus laws, which had enabled policemen to stop and search and to arrest individuals on the street without any cause. As a result of that Act, an officer was required to have reasonable grounds for suspecting that when he stopped and searched someone, he would find a weapon or stolen articles or tools for the purpose of committing offences. That is the basic law, to which Section 44 of the Terrorism Act 2000 is a very considerable exception.
	When the noble Baroness, Lady Scotland, replied to a similar amendment moved by the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy of The Shaws, she said:
	"We think that Section 44 is merited and that it does exactly what it was intended to do inasmuch as stop and search under Section 44 of the Terrorism Act 2000 is an important tool in the ongoing fight against terrorism".—[Official Report, 20/12/05; col. 1635.]
	Having listened to that point, I checked what was said when the Bill that ended in the Terrorism Act 2000 was introduced. In the House of Commons on 14 December 1999, Mr Straw said:
	"The main purpose of the Bill is not to extend the criminal code, but to give the police special powers to enable them to prevent and investigate that special category of crime. Those powers include an enhanced power to arrest and detain suspects, and powers to set up cordons, to stop and search vehicles and pedestrians, to investigate terrorist finances and to examine people passing through ports.
	"The police have no interest in using those powers in circumstances in which the normal criminal law will suffice, nor do they have the resources to do so. In 1998, only 45 people were detained in connection with terrorism, and extensions of detention were granted for just 21 of them".—[Official Report, Commons, 14/12/99; col. 162.]
	Considering those words given by way of introduction to Section 44 of the 2000 Act, it is fair to say that the Home Secretary had in mind a limited power to be exercised in limited circumstances. Indeed, save in one or two respects, the power was limited.
	Authorisation under Section 44 for a uniformed constable to stop a vehicle or a person in a place specified in the authorisation was limited, for example, to a certain period of time. It was to be exercised only for the purpose of searching for articles of a kind which could be used in connection with terrorism, and could be exercised whether or not the constable had grounds for suspecting the presence of articles of that kind, but only for a period of 28 days beginning on the day on which the authorisation was given. The authorisation could be given only if the person giving it considered it expedient for the prevention of acts of terrorism. Those were the limitations of the 2000 Act and it is interesting to note how the legislation has been applied.
	When the Act came into force in 2001, not 45 people were arrested under the powers, but 10,200; by 2003–04 that number had risen to 33,800, and the most recent report from the Home Office records 35,776 searches of vehicles and people, of whom only 455 were arrested—not for terrorism offences but for matters discovered on their arrest under Section 44.
	On the type of people who have been arrested, a detailed breakdown stopped in 2003–04 under this Act showed that more than one in five was black or Asian, and of course that was before the events of last July, since which time there has been a huge increase in the number of black and Asian people who have been stopped. Noble Lords may recall that while saying that they were not stereotyping, the British Transport Police issued a directive to their officers saying that they should target a part of the population.
	Another group which has been targeted is demonstrators, the most famous of whom is Mr Walter Wolfgang, who was arrested under Section 44 powers at a Labour Party conference. A Mr John Catt, an 81 year-old anti-war campaigner was stopped while making his way through Brighton to an anti-war demonstration wearing an anti-Blair T-shirt. So the initial purposes announced by the Home Secretary back in 1999 for the way the powers under Section 44 were to be used have been ignored. The result is a grave danger that sections of the population will feel as targeted under this provision as those who were targeted under the "sus laws", abolished some 22 years ago.
	So it is in that context that I put before noble Lords this modest amendment. It would substitute the words,
	"the person . . . considers it expedient for the prevention of acts of terrorism",
	with the words,
	"'the person . . . reasonably considers it to be necessary for the prevention of acts of terrorism'".
	The amendment also attempts to limit the area in which the provision can be applied. Since 2001, the whole of the Metropolitan Police area has been designated within which the powers of the section can operate. Noble Lords will recall that initially the power was to be given for 28 days in very specific circumstances directly related to terrorism. Now the whole of the Metropolitan Police area is designated on a rolling basis. At the end of a 28-day period, the person who authorised the previous 28-day period signs a piece of paper, takes it to the Home Office where it is rubber-stamped, and the period is renewed for a further 28 days. That has been repeated over a period of five years. No thought is given to individual circumstances.
	For example, one can understand that if a political party conference is being held in Brighton and there are security problems, an authorisation under Section 44 is justified. But to designate the whole of the Metropolitan Police area on a rolling basis year after year was not the original intention of the Act. So the third amendment to the section I want to introduce provides that:
	"The area or place specified in the authorisation may not be greater in extent than is necessary for the purposes of the authorisation".
	It should relate to the area where terrorist activity is thought to be likely to take place. I shall turn to the question of publicity in a moment.
	The Act requires the person authorising the powers under Section 44 to inform the Home Secretary "as soon as practicable", to which I seek to add the words,
	"and in any event within 24 hours",
	and finally, to introduce some transparency. The noble Baroness, Lady Scotland, suggested that we do not tell anyone which areas are subject to an authorisation under the Act, because all the terrorists will go to some other area and therefore that would be wrong. That is not a sensible way of proceeding: if a particular part of London, or of England and Wales is thought to require this special protection, the public should know about it and it should not be a matter of operational secrecy simply rolling over the authorisation, as has happened over a wide area. That is the reason for the final part of the amendment on publicity: that,
	"The Secretary of State shall publicise without delay and in such manner as he considers appropriate, the confirmation, cancellation or renewal of an authorisation".
	Obviously we on these Benches are anxious—as are noble Lords in every part of the House—to have effective tools to combat the curse of terrorism in our society, but we believe that those tools need to be focused, specific and not in themselves to cause a problem in the community by bringing about a sense of grievance among tens of thousands of people who are being stopped and searched for no proper reason. I beg to move.

Lord Harris of Haringey: My Lords, I have discussed this in some detail. If you go through London borough by London borough to identify potential targets, your Lordships may be surprised to know that there is no London borough which does not have significant potential targets in its area—whether they are installations of military significance or of major importance to the infrastructure or to the functioning of the state, or whatever else. Every part of London could potentially be a target. If you add to that the present objective of the terrorism that we are having to deal with—to inflict mass casualties—you start to think about places of entertainment, major shopping centres, football stadia and so on. It becomes very difficult to say that there is no part of London which is immune.
	Whether the approach of saying, "Let us designate the entire metropolitan police district rather than being a bit more selective" or whether it is right that this should happen on a regular basis, it is not appropriate to comment. But I come to where I started when I intervened initially. Clearly, the police in using the powers under Section 44 must be very mindful of the danger of misuse and must avoid a situation in which we have recreated the sus laws, which many of us were involved in arguing against at the time. That is why I come back to the way in which the Act is used—the way in which guidance is given to individual police officers about the circumstances in which they should do this, the way in which the stops take place, and the nature of the interaction between the police stopping an individual or a car and what is said to the individual concerned.

Lord Harris of Haringey: Then before she completely sits down, My Lords, the first three parts of the amendment are precisely that in terms of setting definitions about the way Section 44 might be used. They clearly tighten the definition, and that may meet some of what the noble Lord and my noble friend are trying to achieve. But the fourth point, about publicity, seems to be a separate issue and I am not sure that it is helpful to the objectives the noble Baroness is trying to encourage us to meet.

Lord Bassam of Brighton: My Lords, I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Kingsland, that although strictly speaking we were not working within the confines of debate at Third Reading, it was a useful exchange and there was value added through the points made. Although we may ultimately disagree, and it seems as though we will have a Division on this, there is a spirit in your Lordships' House which recognises that there is a real and genuine problem, that there is merit in the current way in which the powers work, and an understanding at least of the import of those powers in combating terrorism. There is a shared objective to do exactly that.
	We have debated these issues at some length, and it is not my intention to go over so much of the ground. It is plain that we in the Government do not agree with the amendment and that we are satisfied with existing arrangements, but it is worth reminding your Lordships' House of some key points which I think are highly pertinent.
	As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, recognised, stop and search under Section 44 of the Terrorism Act 2000 is an important tool in the ongoing fight against terrorism. It is part of a structured anti-terrorist strategy. The powers help to deter terrorist activity by creating a more difficult environment for would-be terrorists to operate in. An authorisation under Section 44 of the Terrorism Act gives the power to stop and search pedestrians, vehicles, drivers and passengers, in the area specified in the authorisation. An authorisation can only be given if it is expedient for the prevention of acts of terrorism. I do not agree with the point that was made about them being merely rubber stamped. They have to be made by an officer of ACPO rank and must be confirmed by the Secretary of State within 48 hours in order to remain valid after that period. The powers can be authorised in particular locations and for a particular period of time. The noble Lord, Lord Harris of Haringey, made some extremely important points why that might be, in particular with regard to London.
	The noble Lord's proposal would amend the grounds for authorisation of the powers from "expedient" to,
	"necessary for the prevention of acts of terrorism".
	The terrorist threat is, as we all recognise, evolving. It has changed much since the passing of the Terrorism Act 2000. The terrorist threat is now much higher and has changed in its nature, from hostile reconnaissance through to the planning and commission of actual attacks. Applying grounds of necessary for the prevention of acts of terrorism would demand, I argue, an untenable threshold to be reached, and would require a level of intelligence about the specific movements of terrorists that would greatly reduce the police's capacity to deter and disrupt terrorist activity proactively. Intelligence rarely allows such a defined threat to be identified, and the police must be allowed to make informed and evidenced assessments of where the powers are best utilised, based on the information available.
	The noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, made much of the increase—as he put it—of stops and searches since previous legislation. Our point is simply this: Section 44 of the Terrorism Act is the equivalent of previous powers contained in the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1989, something of which the noble Lord, Lord Kingsland, will no doubt be familiar. Numbers of people stopped and searched under those powers were at a similar level in the late 1990s to the latest published figures under Section 44. It is important to differentiate between arrest and stop-and-search powers. Arrests are not necessarily a measure of the effectiveness of these powers, but they do help to deter, disrupt and detect terrorist activities.
	It may help the House if I provide some further statistical information in terms of the section and the way it is operated. In 2003–04, of the vehicle occupants stopped and searched under Section 44(1), 70 per cent of those searched were white, 10 per cent were black, and 12 per cent were Asian. Of the pedestrians stopped under Section 44(2), 72 per cent of those searched were white, 14 per cent Asian and 7 per cent black. Overall, searches of white people increased from 14,429 to 20,632—up 43 per cent. Searches of black people increased from 1,745 to 2,701—admittedly up 55 per cent. Searches of Asian people increased from 2,989 to 3,661—up 22 per cent. Of the total number of stops and searches, 78 per cent took place in the Metropolitan police district and the City of London Police area. It is worth noting that the ethnic breakdown of the populations of those areas is significantly more diverse than the overall figure for England and Wales for a whole.
	The figures for the 2003–04 period show that the numbers of stops and searches has risen across all ethnic groups, but the proportion of Asians stopped and searched has fallen slightly. The noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, made particular reference to the arrest of Mr Walter Wolfgang. It is the case that the police can use Section 44 in support of a structured counter-terrorist operation. Every senior member of the Government was present at the Labour Party conference, so it is not unnatural that the local police put in place appropriate security arrangements, and rightly so. It has been averred that this is an important factor and feature of conference activity now, and sadly that will probably remain the case for some time. We have always maintained that law enforcement agencies must have appropriate powers, which must be used properly, fairly and consistently. With regard to Mr Walter Wolfgang, my understanding is that the Sussex police rightly apologised to him, and acknowledge that the mention of powers under Section 44 of the Terrorism Act was a genuine mistake in this instance.
	The contributions about the rubbing points with regard to the use of the powers were important. We must ensure that these powers are used in a way that does not alienate part of our population and make them hostile to the overall effect of the terrorism legislation. Without that policing by consent in this field, the operation of counter-terrorist activities will be made all the more difficult. I entirely agree with that spirit. I do not think that, in the round, powers used under this part of the Terrorism Act do that. The police are extremely conscious of the need to take people with them. My noble friend Lord Harris of Haringey made those points very well, with his experience as chair of the country's largest police authority and his long involvement with policing in London.
	The final point I ought to respond to is that made by the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, about the intent of the Act. It envisages that the whole of a force area can be authorised, and it was clearly the intention of Parliament that this option was available to police, in circumstances where it is warranted and justified. The noble Lord, Lord Harris, gave a good explanation of why that might be the case in London. The public would not greatly thank us if the police were not able to exercise their powers in that way, if it was felt there was a major terrorist threat. I argue that these powers will be used proportionately; the powers that have preceded them have been used proportionately, and the British public deserve the protection they afford. We cannot accept these amendments.

Lord Thomas of Gresford: My Lords, I am most grateful to the Minister for his reply, and to all those who have spoken in this debate. The contribution of the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Swynnerton, was a wonderful illustration of precisely where Section 44 is not being used properly. I remind your Lordships of something I said at the beginning; that under Section 45 of the Act the power conferred by an authorisation may be exercised only for the purpose of searching for articles of a kind that could be used in connection with terrorism. I fail to understand how, in the circumstances described by the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, the police officer could have thought he was likely to find any articles concerned with terrorism. That is an unpublicised situation. When we deal with the position of Mr Wolfgang or anyone else who is simply a protester, the matter becomes even more absurd.
	The purpose of this amendment is not to alter Section 44 in any drastic way. Indeed, I am sure the noble Lord, Lord Harris, would happily accept subsections (1), (2) and (3); it is only the question of publicity that he objects to, and I will deal with that in a moment. The amendment would bring the section back to the purposes for which it was originally designed, as stated by the then Home Secretary, Mr Straw, when he introduced the Bill in 1999.
	I said that I would say a word about publicity. It is a fundamental principle that when we are abroad, in England and Wales, we know the law that affects us. We are entitled as citizens to know whether there are any specific provisions that give the police powers in the area where we are. It is incumbent upon the Secretary of State to declare the area to which the special powers apply. No one could be more concerned about the protection of the public than I am, but I do not believe it is helpful, or that it was the intent of this Act when it was passed, for whole areas—and there may be whole cities outside London; we do not know, because they are not declared—to be subject to these special powers permanently, rolling on, 28 days after 28 days, without any obvious consideration being given on a monthly basis of whether they are necessary.
	The word I take from the speech of the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy, whose amendment was the precursor to what I am saying—I am merely a follower in her footsteps—is "alienation", to which the Minister also referred. It is a balance. Everything we have dealt with in the Terrorism Act ultimately turns out to be a balance between the liberty of the people of this country and the need to protect them. I think the Act as originally drafted, in its original intention, struck a reasonable balance, but it has been misused in the way that I have indicated. Therefore, I seek to test the opinion of the House.

On Question, Whether the said amendment (No. 14) shall be agreed to?
	Their Lordships divided: Contents, 109; Not-Contents, 124

Baroness Farrington of Ribbleton: I am in the happy position of being able to agree with virtually everything every noble Lord has said on this amendment. This amendment would prevent—in response to the noble Earl, Lord Peel—Natural England from offering training directly, and require it to commission third parties. Natural England will always seek to achieve best value for money, and I am certain that this will often lead it to buy training and many other services from specialist bodies. The noble Baroness, Lady Miller of Chilthorne Domer, referred to local authorities and their experience, and to universities and colleges of agriculture.
	However, that will not always be the case. In order to further its purpose, Natural England needs to be able to use its expertise directly to help others to deliver. This clause allows, as my noble friend Lord Judd said, Natural England to run its own training courses when doing so is most cost-effective. This might be particularly appropriate, for example, in relation to the nature reserves it manages.
	The existing word also sends the positive signal that Natural England will engage directly with customers and stakeholders to deliver its outcomes. I think, on the basis of the virtual unanimity around the House, the noble Baroness will feel able to withdraw her amendment.

Lord Geddes: The noble Baroness has not indicated her intention to oppose Clause 12 stand part.

Baroness Byford: This is a simple, clarifying amendment that seeks to identify how exactly and to what extent Natural England will use its so-called incidental powers. I have been reassured in consultation that it is quite natural for a public body to have incidental powers, but I am slightly alarmed that under Clause 13 Natural England may,
	"do anything that appears to it to be conducive or incidental to the discharge of its functions".
	The clause continues:
	"In particular, Natural England may . . . acquire or dispose of property",
	or "borrow money".
	That seems to be a remarkably wide-ranging description of powers that are meant to be merely incidental. In my layman's reading of the clause, if Natural England decided that it wanted to carry out a biodiversity function on a farm, it would be perfectly able to do so under the clause, overriding the management agreements and constrictions that have already been heavily debated.
	Will the Minister tell us how Natural England will be financed in the future? In earlier debates, we talked about start-up clauses and the costs and savings. Certainly, Lord Haskins' review was clear about two things: first, the body should reduce regulation; secondly, it should reduce costs. We have debated those costs, and the Minister has kindly written to me about them, but I am talking about future costs. Will Defra or other departments give grants so that Natural England can maintain the very nature of what it is supposed to be doing, or might Natural England look elsewhere for funding; for example, from the National Lottery?
	Will the Minister comment on the article in Monday's edition of the Daily Telegraph, which said:
	"'Green' farms face 40pc cut after EU deal by Blair"?
	That suggests that there will be great pressure on money available through the Rural Development Service for the agri-environment agreements. If so, what will happen to the bodies and to the agreements that farmers and former bodies have had? I understand that money is likely to be obtained from the National Lottery, which slightly alarms me. I must question whether this is the right place for the funding of such a major new non-departmental public body, because on the whole the lottery is a one-off available funding source. If it will be competing with other bodies that might want to appeal to the lottery for grants, will it have the prime pull on that money, and if so, is that not likely to jeopardise other smaller bodies that want to appeal on their own behalf rather than through Natural England to gain extra grants. There is therefore quite a large question mark on the future funding of Natural England.

Lord Jopling: When I read Clause 13, my mind goes back—probably a good deal further than that of many noble Lords who sit in the House at this late hour—to another place in the late 1960s, when I spoke on behalf of the Opposition and when the then Minister of Agriculture, Fred Peart, who was much admired by a great many of us and who became Leader of another place and then Leader of your Lordships' House, introduced legislation to set up rural development boards.
	Those rural development boards from the 1960s also had a power to acquire and dispose of property. I recall that the organisation was set up in the north Pennines, with its headquarters in my old constituency of Appleby. One of the things it did was to acquire a very run-down estate owned by the trustees of a Member of your Lordships' House who is now deceased and whose name I shall not repeat. The board purchased that property with a view to setting up a project of great social and economic engineering in Nidderdale. At the time the project generated deep hostility because it was felt that it was not for a state organisation to acquire large swathes of country, whether in Nidderdale or elsewhere, in order to carry out the sort of social engineering which I think is implicit in Clause 2, covering Natural England's general purposes.
	I have a good deal of sympathy with the amendment. Call it déjà vu if you like, but I am anxious about setting up an organisation with powers to acquire and dispose of property and to carry out social and economic well-being policies, as described in Clause 2. Can the Minister tell us what he thinks Natural England will do if it acquires or disposes of property? If he cannot do so tonight, perhaps between now and the Report stage he can consider whether the example of the rural development board set up in the 1960s is being resuscitated today. It really was a disaster and the board was wound up in the early 1970s, largely because of its grandiose plans to acquire swathes of the countryside in order to carry out social and economic engineering exercises. I hope that we are not retracing that disastrous step which, thank God, was cut off at its stocking tops in the early days.

Lord Bach: So we believe that Clause 13 strikes the right balance and will enable Natural England to carry out its functions properly and efficiently. The budget was agreed as part of the EU budget deal in December with a seven-year ceiling of €69.75 billion, which is roughly—I repeat, roughly—equivalent to current spending; that is, for the present financial perspective, which is 1999-2006. This one is for 2007–13. The new budget will include spending for Bulgaria and Romania plus the current 25 member states. The agreed budget also increases emphasis on new member states rural development expenditure—at least, €33.1 billion.
	However, the rural development budget for the EU 15 was cut in order to get a deal due to reluctance to further cuts in Pillar 1. Securing voluntary modulation was an important part of the budget agreement, certainly for the United Kingdom. Member states can voluntarily modulate up to 20 per cent of their Pillar 1 budget for use on Pillar 2 rural development expenditure. Unlike compulsory EU modulation, financing voluntary modulation does not have to be co-financed by member states before it is spent. It is a welcome flexibility to choose co-financing levels rather than to have to accept imposed levels. As the Committee will know, there is pressure from farming bodies against moves to increase modulation without co-financing.
	A number of further details have to be worked out. The agreed EU budget still needs European Parliament endorsement and the allocation of main funding—that is to say, outside convergence regions for all member states to be proposed by the Commission in line with the rural development regulation. The amount left to be allocated to the EU 15 from ex-guarantee will be €18.91 billion. Compulsory EU modulation will add approximately €7 billion across the EU, all of which must be match-funded by member states.
	That takes us to the article in the Daily Telegraph, which was referred to by the noble Baroness. While I encourage all Members of the Committee to look at that article, written by a most reputable journalist, I also encourage the Committee to read my letter, published in that newspaper today, which attempts to deal with some of the point on which we think that the article was wrong. My letter makes it clear that it is no secret that we wanted, as a country, to reduce mainstream CAP subsidy payments to provide funds for rural development. I believe the committee of the noble Lord, Lord Renton, would heartily approve of this. The agreed EU budget for rural development spending is roughly the same as expenditure in the current period. It is not true that the deal will cause a 40 per cent cut, I argue, in payments for green farming in the UK. The key to funding the new environmental stewardship scheme in England was agreement in December to allow transfers of up to 20 per cent from CAP subsidies to fund such schemes. We believe that is a significant step forward in our strategy to shift CAP funds to environmentally sustainable farming.
	It was also not true that only the first 5 per cent can be match-funded by Government. Member states can choose the level of match funding that they allocate. Lastly, the article claimed that Defra Ministers have written a joint letter to the Prime Minister with the Environment Agency, RSPB and English Nature. Defra Ministers have not written such a letter. I could go on, but think that at this hour to say more about that settlement would mean that we have less to say when we come to debate these matters in due course.
	The noble Baroness asked about future funding of Natural England. Natural England will receive the core of its funding from Defra. A large part will be for the agri-environment programme. We expect Natural England to seek appropriate sources of income from other areas, as the Countryside Agency and English Nature have done. That could include the lottery, sources of targeted EU finding and even commercial sponsorship. It is for the lottery distributors to decide their policies for giving awards, and it would not be right to prevent Natural England from receiving lottery grants. Natural England will have a total budget of over £300 million.
	I hope I have gone some way to answering the points made in this debate.

Baroness Byford: The noble Lord has indeed gone part way to answering my questions, but has left some questions in the air. I am not going to press him at this stage. I thank my noble friend Lord Jopling for taking us down memory lane because it is important that, in planning for the future, we reflect on what worked in the past, and perhaps on where some of the disadvantages were. I do not know that the Minister has clarified or reduced his anxieties about it. My noble friend is shaking his head, and my head is going to shake in the same way. The noble Lord, Lord Renton, and the Minister will no doubt resolve his anxieties as regards his particular question.
	To return to the issue I raised on the long-term funding of Natural England, the Minister has suggested—I will have to read it carefully—that the main core funding will come from Defra. When he says "main core funding", is he talking about 50 per cent, 60 or 90 per cent? How much is actually committed at this stage from Defra or from other sources? How much of that money is going to be sought from other areas as the Minister has described? How much of the use of lottery and other moneys is actually desirable in the long-term interests of a non-departmental government body, and even further on those who might be applying to the lottery? Our concern is for organisations that work out in the community which wish to seek lottery money. If they seek to cover or be involved in some of the aspects covered by Natural England, their moneys may not be forthcoming because the lottery could say that Natural England has applied for that particular purpose, and that it will distribute money as and when to causes it feels are worthwhile. Although I thank the Minister for his attempt in answering, we must return to this issue because it is unsatisfactory. If between now and Report he could let us know what degree of core funding is likely to come, that would be helpful. Perhaps a message is coming, so I will keep chatting for a minute. As I say, I am not at all happy that some proportion of that money will be sought from organisations such as the lottery that could grant money one year and not be in the position to grant it another. That does not give Natural England a good base financially. Perhaps the Minister has some news for me. No, I see that he does not. Then we will return to the issue later, but at this stage I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Moved accordingly, and, on Question, Motion agreed to.
	House resumed.
	House adjourned at sixteen minutes past ten o'clock.
	Racial and Religious Hatred Bill
	Bill returned from the Commons with the amendments agreed to.
	Wednesday, 1 February 2006.